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1. Introduction
Recent reports by international organisations and a number of studies (Petrakos and 
Totev 1999a, 1999b, Dobrinsky 1999, Jackson and Petrakos 1999) have indicated that 
among transition countries in Europe, the Balkan countries have an inferior economic 
performance and structure compared to the Central European ones. The available data 
seems to indicate that the Balkan countries have not been able to recover from the shock 
of transition from centrally planned to market economies, despite the fact that this 
process has lasted for nearly 10 years. A number of Balkan countries in transition have 
experienced repeated economic crises during this period that have caused a serious 
divergence from the record of the other European transition countries.
There is already a number of propositions that explicitly or implicitly compete in their 
attempt to account for differences in performance among transition economies in Europe 
and especially for this inability of the Balkan transition countries to follow the Central 
European ones (Petrakos and Christodoulakis 1998). The most widely shared 
explanation relates poor outcomes with delayed and non-persistent policies of 
privatisation and market liberalisation. Although everybody would agree that poorly 
designed or implemented policies cannot have significant results, it can be the case that 
properly designed or implemented policies do not have significant results either, if other 
background factors have an offsetting influence. The exclusive reliance on "policy 
failures" to explain diverging patterns of performance does not leave ground for a 
convincing answer to the question why all lagging behind European countries in the 
transition process happen to be in the South.
Searching for alternative explanations, we have to take into consideration first the 
evidence provided in the literature and the propositions (some times speculative) about 
the factors that have produced such a differentiated outcome in various transition 
countries. A non-exclusive list of these factors would include: (a) "Policy failure" 
explanations, according to mainstream economic thinking, that attribute poor transition 
performance to delayed reforms and non-persistent policies of privatisation and market 
liberalisation, (b) "Market failure" explanations that consider the "shock therapy" of 
massive privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation in the absence of appropriate 
institutional arrangements as the primary factor explaining repeated crises in a number of 
transition countries, (c) Explanations pointing to different initial conditions with respect 
to the structure of the economies and the enterprises, as well as to different initial 
conditions with respect to infrastructure and human capital development, (d)
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Explanations pointing to different conditions with respect to geographical features such 
as centrality, adjacency, proximity and accessibility of major European markets and 
different ranking in the new European economic order that affect capital mobility, 
attraction of higher functional order activities and diffusion of technology and know­
how, (e) Explanations related to institutional differences and differences in historical 
experience with market mechanisms and operations.
The transition countries in the Balkans are not the only ones in the region that face 
serious economic difficulties and challenges. Greece on the one hand, despite being the 
most developed and stable economy and the only member of the European Union (EU) 
in the region and despite recent progress, is facing serious structural problems in its 
economy. It is in fact the only EU country that has not met the Maastricht criteria and 
therefore is for the moment left outside the EMU. On the other hand, Turkey, despite its 
significant size and strong potential for growth and development, is also plagued by a 
number of very serious economic and structural problems.
For the residents of the Balkans, these disappointing facts are in absolute contrast with 
their pride and own vision of their identity, the diverse environment and resources of the 
region, its historical and cultural heritage and the fact that large parts of the region were 
for centuries the civilisation and development centre of the known world. In the minds of 
many people there is a question why in the post-1989 European architecture the Balkan 
region has been such a profound case of failure and why from all possible development 
paths, the one that eventually materialised seems to be the worst?
Without ignoring the importance of the other factors mentioned before, this article 
provides an additional explanation of this diverging performance. It is argued here that 
the prevailing fragmentation and conflict in the Balkan region, as well as the existing 
ethnic rivalry and regional instability are major factors that significantly impede growth, 
structural change, economic progress, transformation and development. In the following 
sections we present a number of theoretical propositions and analyse some basic 
economic characteristics of the Balkan region related to market size, development 
potentials, trade relations and foreign direct investment. On the basis of these 
characteristics we will attempt in the concluding section to highlight the costs and 
benefits of the options available to the individual countries in the region with respect to 
regional conflict or regional co-operation.
2. Geography and development: the questions we fail to ask
In this section we address some issues concerning the geography of development and 
relate them to the prospects and possibilities of the Balkan countries to reverse existing 
trends in their economic performance. We do that by asking the following set of 
questions: (a) Is it possible for a country engaged (in one way or another) in a regional 
conflict to prosper? (b) Is it possible for a country to prosper in a depressed and 
unstable region? (c) Is it possible for a country to grow and develop without having 
economic relations with its neighbouring countries? (d) Is it possible for the Balkan 
region to really converge - even in the distant future - towards the EU economic 
standards without eliminating first all sources of tension and conflict among Balkan 
countries?
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Economic theory offers an analytical framework, which helps us to understand some 
neglected aspects of international relations and provide an answer with some policy value 
to these questions. In this section we are going to examine: (i) the role of rationally 
formed expectations and positive or negative externalities in the expansion of economic 
activities, (ii) the role of internal and external economies of scale for economic efficiency 
and competitiveness, and (iii) the role of regional trade multipliers for growth and 
development. The analysis of these issues will provide a basis for the discussion of the 
preceding questions.
Expectations, uncertainty and externalities
It is argued here that fragmentation and conflict impedes economic growth for at least 
three interacting reasons. First, it generates uncertainty and does not allow economic 
agents to plan for the future and commit themselves to specific economic activities, as 
their expectations about the future are formed not on the basis of competitive 
advantages, specialisation and available opportunities, but on the basis of political factors 
and external forces that are largely independent from market processes and 
unpredictable.
Therefore, political instability, social - ethnic unrest and unsolved frictions with 
neighbouring countries over ethnic minorities or territorial disputes, are factors 
generating serious uncertainty to markets and economic activity. Their immediate impact 
is to cancel running or planned (domestic or foreign) investment projects, while their 
long-term impact is to put at serious risk the prospects of the country for growth and 
development.
Moreover, a country can be affected by the negative externalities of a regional crisis, 
even if it is not directly involved. The war in Serbia and Kosovo has affected Greece, by 
reducing tourism, trade and investment activities in the country and imposing longer 
transportation routes for its exports to EU markets. In addition, and this is equally 
serious, the expectations of people and firms about the future have become less 
optimistic, despite the significant progress of the economy.
Overall, instability and conflict in a region will affect negatively all countries, regardless 
of their actual involvement, as expectations are formed on the basis of risk aversion, not 
the specific conditions prevailing in each country. Negative expectations about the 
future, may affect in a very direct way the real economy today, if economic units cancel 
or postpone their activities and take defensive positions. This, may have a “domino” 
effect to all countries in the region, its magnitude being a function of proximity and 
intensity of relations with the area and the parties involved in the conflict.
Internal and external economies of scale
Second, market fragmentation, the result of socio-political fragmentation, generates 
serious inefficiencies in the productive sector of each country, as several industries, in 
order to operate efficiently and be competitive, require internal and external economies
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of scale, not available in small markets. Internal economies of scale are attained when 
industrial firms have a sufficient size and production level, which guarantees that 
resources are combined efficiently and therefore output has a competitive price. 
Therefore in order for industrial firms to benefit from economies of scale, they must 
operate in large national markets, or be able to promote their products in a larger 
geographical market that exceeds national borders. External economies of scale are 
attained when industrial firms develop dense inter-firm relations with other firms 
operating in the same sector (joint R&D programs, labour force training programs, 
subcontracting joint supplies, etc.) or in forward and backward related sectors (supplier- 
producer and producer-consumer relationships). In order for a firm to benefit from 
external economies of scale, the national productive base must be rich in productive 
activities (a condition that cannot be met by small economies) or open to co-operation 
with other nearby economies.
As a result, small economies are required to be open and allow their firms to operate in a 
larger geographical market. For firms operating under economies of scale, neighbouring 
countries are the best markets for their products. This is because consumers in 
neighbouring countries usually have similar preferences implying an easier and deeper 
market penetration. In addition, adjacency and proximity between two countries implies 
a lower transportation cost.
Regional multipliers, intra-industry and intra-regional trade.
Third, fragmentation and conflict in a region is a major obstacle to growth and 
development, as it restricts the operation of regional multipliers and does not allow for 
the benefits of regional interaction and export-led growth to be fully realised. The 
concept of regional multiplier is based on two conditions: First, trade is more intensive 
among neighbours because of the benefits of similar preferences and lower transportation 
cost. Second, this intensive interaction implies that high growth rates in one country can 
be quickly transmitted to neighbouring countries due to increasing demand for imports. 
Therefore, growth in one country can partly be driven by exports to expanding 
neighbouring economies that experience a fast increasing demand. Generalising this 
argument, it becomes obvious that in a region with no major obstacles to communication 
and interaction, each country: (a) benefits from the progress made in the other countries 
and (b) contributes to that progress and the overall progress of the region.
In addition, international economic theory and evidence indicates that trade among 
neighbours is the most beneficial type of trade, because of its sectoral structure and 
composition. The critical issue here is whether two countries (or groups of countries) 
tend to specialize and trade products that belong to different industries (inter-industry 
type of trade) or tend to trade more intensively products within the same industry (intra­
industry type of trade). Several studies have shown that the inter-industry type of trade is 
suitable only for countries with comparable levels of development. This is because in the 
case of trade between a developed and a developing country, the first will specialize in 
capital and technology-intensive products, while the second will necessarily specialize in 
labor or resource-intensive products, missing the opportunity to industrialize and 
therefore missing the opportunity to develop. Also the inter-industry type of trade 
relations are considered to cause, in several cases, severe adjustments to the productive
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base of a country as some sectors shrink and some others expand, a process that is not 
always free of social friction.
On the other hand, trade within the same industry is not associated with major structural 
adjustment (as adjustment takes place within the industry or even within the firm) and it 
usually characterizes neighboring countries with similar levels of development and similar 
tastes. In addition, intra-industry trade allows for the expansion of economic relations in 
a more diversified manner, without exerting pressure for a strict specialisation that would 
perhaps require severe structural adjustments in the countries involved. This leaves some 
room for restructuring policies in order to reorganise productive resources within 
sectors, maintaining existing specialisations and avoiding major sectoral shifts of 
resources that could generate structural unemployment and reduce the diversity of the 
production base. It is not a coincidence that all developed countries have the highest 
share of their trade taking place within sectors and in addition taking place with 
neighbouring countries.
To sum up, intra-regional or cross-border trade, or trade among neighbours is essential 
for the growth and development of a country for the following reasons: (a) It allows for 
a higher volume of trade and therefore for export-led growth due to similar consumer 
preferences and lower transportation cost, (b) it allows small economies to benefit from 
economies of scale in industrial production, by providing a larger geographical market 
that is easily accessible and (c) it allows for a sectoral structure of economic relations 
(intra-industry), that does not threaten the diversity of its productive base.
3. The evidence we need to consider
Any effort to understand the potentials of the Balkan region and the development options 
and strategies available to individual countries, depends necessarily on a set of basic 
information concerning the relative standing of each country and the region in the 
broader European context. In Table 1 we present information about population, area. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GDP) per capita for all 
Balkan countries and the EU. The information is presented in absolute figures and also 
as a share of the EU figure. Starting with population, we observe that with the exception 
of Turkey and Romania, the other Balkan countries are relatively small or very small in 
size, especially if one compares with the total population of the EU. Three countries 
(Albania, FYROM and Slovenia) have a population size that is less than 1% of the total 
population of the EU. When however all Balkan countries are considered as a group, the 
picture changes considerably. The total population of the Balkan region amounts to 132 
million people, which is equal to about 35% of the population of the EU.
Examining the size of the territory of each Balkan country separately, the picture is 
similar. Turkey and Romania possess a significant area, followed by Greece, Bulgaria 
and Serbia. The other countries possess very small territories, the smallest being those of 
Slovenia and FYROM. When however the Balkan region is considered as a whole, the 
picture changes considerably, as it covers an area that is equal to about 48% of the area 
oftheEU.
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Turning now to the economic figures of the Table, we see that the general picture is very 
different. With the exception of Turkey (which has the larger GDP) and Greece, that 
have in relative terms a significant economy, the other countries in the region have to a 
large extent very small and insignificant economies. It is very indicative that all together 
the eight (8) Balkan countries in transition have a GDP level that is smaller than the GDP 
level of Greece alone and of course of Turkey. Comparing the size of the Balkan 
economies as a whole to that of the EU, we get a disappointing figure. The size of the 
economy of the 10 Balkan countries put together is equal to only 5% of the size of the 
EU economy. Even more disappointing are the figures related to GNP per capita that 
measure development and welfare levels. With the exception of Greece and Slovenia, all 
the other countries have GNP per capita figures that are less than 20% of the average 
figure of the EU. Some countries like Albania, Bosnia, FYROM and Bulgaria have 
welfare figures that are not considered acceptable for European countries. Greece is the 
only country in the region with a GNP per capita figure that exceeds the 50% of the EU 
average.
To summarise, despite its potential (given by population and territorial size), the 
importance of the Balkan economy (given by GDP) and its weight and significance 
(given by GNP per capita) are very limited in the European context. Some countries are 
unsustainable small in terms of population and economic activity and insignificant in 
terms of development levels. This is not necessarily a problem in an integrated regional 
economic space. However, the small economies of the region operate in a politically 
fragmented and in some cases frictional or even hostile regional environment. This 
intensifies the problems of inefficiency in their productive base, making it unsustainable 
in the new gobalised economic environment.
In Table 2 we present information about the flows and stock of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the Balkan transition countries, the transition countries in Central 
Europe1, Greece, Turkey and the EU. The information is presented in million USD and 
in figures per capita. Looking at inward flows first, we observe that the Balkan transition 
countries received in 1997 only 28% of the FDI going to transition countries in Central 
Europe, despite the fact that these two groups have a similar size in terms of population. 
We also observe that Turkey, despite its population and GDP size, has received an 
insignificant amount of FDI in the same year. Comparisons among countries or groups of 
countries are equally dramatic when we look at per capita flow figures. Greece, the only 
country in the region enjoying relative stability and the only member of the EU, has the 
highest FDI per capita flow figure, which is close to 50% of the EU figure. Among 
transition countries, the Balkans have a per capita figure that is less than half the Central 
European one. Finally, Turkey is a destination of a relatively insignificant amount of 
foreign investment in 1997.
Looking at accumulated (stock) FDI and FDI per capita figures, the picture is similar. 
The Balkans are a less frequently chosen destination than Central Europe, while Turkey 
is in an inferior position. Greece, is the only country in the region that stands out with an 
FDI stock per capita figure that is equal to 62% of the EU figure.
1 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
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Why are these figures important and what do they really mean? FDI flows or stock 
indicate the attractiveness of a country or a region to international investors. Therefore, 
the first point of this Table is that international investors (small and large private foreign 
firms, multinational corporations or even foreign public sector firms) are, under present 
conditions, less willing to invest in the Balkans than in other competing destinations like 
the countries in Central Europe. The only exception to this rule is Greece, a politically 
stable country and a member of the EU. Taking into consideration that the vast size of 
the region and its low cost production base2 3is a real advantage for foreign firms 
operating in global markets, there must be some other offsetting factors hindering the 
expansion of foreign firms in the region. These factors are the fragmentation of the 
region in many small, unstable and at times conflicting countries. As it has been discussed 
before, fragmentation implies small and insignificant market sizes, while conflict implies 
an uncertain business environment. These two factors are the most important ones in 
explaining the absence of FDI in the region/ The limited amount of FDI in the region 
has several negative effects, as foreign capital is an important supplement to domestic 
capital formation and its in several cases the avenue of technological progress and 
structural change in host economies. It is not accidental that all countries, even the most 
advanced ones, have adopted special promotion programs and openly compete with each 
other in order to attract a significant volume of FDI. As the economy becomes more and 
more globalised, FDI will play an increasingly more important role for the development, 
technological advancement and structural change of host countries. The fact that the 
Balkans run a real danger to be left outside this trend, is a measure of the marginalisation 
of their economy with long term consequences for growth and prosperity in the region.
In Table 3 we present information concerning the trade relations of each Balkan country4 
with all the others and the EU. In Table 4 we present information about the share of 
exports and imports of a selected group of Western European and Balkan countries with 
their neighbours. All exports and imports data are for 1997. Starting from Table 3, we 
observe that several Balkan countries, despite being neighbours and despite similarities in 
development levels, culture and consumer preferences, have insignificant trade relations. 
For example, Bulgaria exports only 2.0% of its total exports to FYROM and only 1.4% 
to Romania. Similarly, Turkey exports only 0.7% of its total exports to Bulgaria and 
1.1% to Greece. The countries with the lowest share of intra Balkan trade relations are 
Turkey, Romania and Greece with a share of 4.2%, 7.9% and 11.2% respectively of total 
exports going to the other Balkan countries and a share of 2.7%, 4.6% and 3.7% 
respectively of total imports coming from other Balkan countries. The countries with the 
highest shares are Croatia, FYROM and Bulgaria with a share of 30.3%, 25.9% and 
23.1% (11.4%38.2% and 9.8%) of their exports (imports) going to (coming from) other 
Balkan countries. It is worth noting that geography affects intra-regional trade, as the 
more perimetric countries with respect to the Balkan region, like Turkey and Romania, 
have the lowest intra-regional interaction. On the contrary, central Balkan countries like 
FYROM and Bulgaria have a higher intra-regional interaction. It is also worth noting 
that all countries (except FYROM) have higher export than import shares with the other 
Balkan countries, because of their dependence on imports from developed countries.
2 Labour cost in the Balkan countries is the lowest in Europe.
3 Other factors that have been found in the economic literature to have an impact on the direction of FDI 
are proximity or adjacency of host countries to the large and more developed EU markets, as well as 
cultural affinity.
4 Except Albania, Bosnia and Serbia, for which there is no reliable information.
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Looking at Table 4 we observe that significant differences exist between Western 
European and Balkan countries with respect to the share of exports and imports with 
neighbouring countries. Austria, for example, has 59.2% of its exports going to 
neighbouring countries and 60.6% of its imports coming from neighbouring countries. 
Similarly, Belgium and Luxembourg have 46.9% (49.9%) of their exports (imports) 
going to (coming from) neighbouring countries. On the other side of the spectrum, 
Greece and Romania have 8.1% and 4.7% (2.8% and 4.2%) respectively of their exports 
(imports) going to (coming from) neighbouring countries. Obviously, in understanding 
the real magnitude of these differences, one has to take into consideration several factors 
such as the size and the development level of neighbouring countries, or the existence of 
the Single European Market among EU members. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that 
intra-regional and cross-border trade in the Balkans is very limited compared to the other 
countries and regions in Europe.
These figures indicate that the Balkans, besides their perimetric location in Europe 
(Petrakos 1997a), are found today in a unique unfavorable situation resulting from 
distorted economic relations, as in several cases their borders are meant to be barriers to 
communication and trade with neighboring countries. This type of “border condition” 
where borderlines in the region operate as barriers to economic and social relations, is a 
rare situation in the history of international relations (Petrakos and Christodoulakis 
1997).
This condition, along with perimetric position in the European economic space generates 
an overall unfavorable index of geographic location, with serious long-term implications 
for the economic structure and performance of the region. The “missing factor” in the 
trade relations among neighbors generates a significant reduction in the trade potential of 
the region, limiting market accessibility for exporting industries and limiting the 
prospects for export-led growth.
Because of these conditions, the trade relations of the Balkan countries have necessarily 
taken an inter-industry character with the more advanced and distant countries of 
Western Europe (Landesmann 1998), with a serious impact on the industrial structure of 
the region. As we have already seen, international economic theory indicates that trade 
with neighboring countries is more intensive and usually takes an intra-industry 
character, implying greater room for more industries to develop. This is because 
international specializations are not mutually exclusive and the division of labor takes 
place within and not between sectors (Petrakos 1997b, Petrakos 1999). Therefore, the 
lack of trade relations among Balkan countries pushes them further towards an inter­
industry type of specialization with the technologically more advanced western European 
countries that is rather unfavorable for the prospects for industrial development in the 
region. In that respect, the old and recent “border conditions” in the region have 
generated a “missing factor” in trade relations that in its turn has imposed additional 
constraints on the already weak structure of the Balkan economy.
Overall, it is claimed here that the performance of the Balkan economies has been 
affected by their artificial division in the pre- and post 1989 period and the consequent 
restrictions imposed on the structure and level of the external economic relations of the 
region. Although there is no direct empirical evidence to support it, we are confident that
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a simple spatial trade model would predict for each Balkan country a very different level 
and structure of trade than the existing one, should barriers to trade with neighboring 
countries had not been imposed.
4. Conclusions: can we make the right choices for the future?
This paper has not intended to provide arguments about the essence of the so many 
disputes and conflicts among ethnic groups or countries in the Balkans. Our contribution 
is in a different direction. We have tried to show that fragmentation and conflicts have a 
serious cost for all countries in the region and not only those directly involved every time 
in a dispute or a war. As a result, it is to the best interest of the people and the 
governments in the Balkans to take seriously under consideration these costs and 
examine in a more thorough and informed way the available options. In doing so, they 
have to look less often at their divided past and more often at the possibility for a 
common future. Other countries, such as Germany and France, or Germany and UK that 
have fought in the past many bloody wars, did that after the Second World War, and 
they have enjoyed for half a century the benefits of stability and prosperity. Learning 
from others, has always been a recipe for success, if one is careful enough to chose the 
right examples.
In examining available options, people and governments in the Balkans also have to take 
a closer look at their immediate environment and the prevailing integration trends in 
Europe. As we move with a faster pace towards a global economy, being part of a large 
economic union is a vital condition for survival and prosperity, especially for small 
countries. Under certain conditions, it is very likely that in two decades all European 
countries will be members (in fact regions) of the strongest economic organisation on 
earth: the European Union. Given that this is the declared strategic goal of all European 
countries that are not currently EU members, three points deserve consideration by 
policy and opinion makers in the Balkans. First, under existing conditions with respect to 
ethnic tensions and disputes, it is highly unlikely that any other Balkan country (except 
Slovenia) will ever join the EU. Second, even if one or two more Balkan countries 
eventually manage to become members, their benefits from membership will be lower 
and their costs higher, if large parts of the Balkan region remain outside the Union. Third 
(and perhaps more important), existing tensions and conflicts about borders and ethnic 
groups will become more or less irrelevant with membership in a larger, stronger, 
integrated and internally open European Union.
If these points make sense, then it is relatively easy to highlight the two distinct options 
available to the people and governments in the Balkans. On the one hand, stands the 
option of solving existing differences in accordance with the “national interests” of each 
country. This option may require the intensification of the disputes and it is understood 
by the parties involved as a zero-sum-game. Some win and some loose. Our earlier 
analysis, however, has shown that although there will certainly be losers at the Balkan 
scale, it is highly unlikely that there will be any winners at the European scale. The 
Balkans may have a different balance of powers, or different borders, but they will still be 
fragmented, perhaps devastated by the conflict, poorer than ever and outside the EU. If 
their strategic goal is still EU membership, it is clear that this option leads to a no-win 
situation.
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The other option implies an understanding that the common interests and goals of the 
countries in the region are much more important than the issues that divide them. In that 
sense, it is a more difficult choice, as it requires a change in the prevailing perceptions of 
the people of each countiy for their neighbours. This option promotes regional co­
operation on the understanding that: (i) this is a better framework to discuss differences, 
(ii) it promotes (the so much needed) regional stability and (iii) the unsolved issues of 
today, might be largely irrelevant in the broader European context of tomorrow. This 
option leads to an all-win situation, to the extent that all countries meet their strategic 
goal to become members of the EU and offer its stability, institutions and prosperity to 
its people.
The second option has an additional advantage, as it is in line with the declared vision of 
the EU for a larger and non-exclusive Europe. This coincidence of intentions generates a 
unique historic opportunity to create an open, stable and prospering economic space 
from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. This 
could be the most valuable contribution to the next generation. The United States of 
Europe are not a more difficult project today than it was the United States of America 
two centuries ago. Then, as in America, the Mediterranean, which is the Sun Belt of 
Europe, will gradually attract quality resources and activities that will allow for a fast 
convergence to the development levels of the West and the North. To make a precarious 
comparison, it could become the California of Europe. For the people in the Balkans, this 
is the best available way to regain the prestige and the pride of their glorious (but distant) 
past.
This option requires that the EU undertakes two important steps. First, it invites all 
Balkan countries to join in the foreseeable future the EU, and works hard and 
consistently for the homogenization of their status through an en-block association 
agreement that will take into consideration the peculiarities of the region and be more 
generous than the existing ones with Bulgaria and Romania. This policy is a cornerstone 
for the future of the Balkan region and it is the only one that allows in the long run the 
unification of the Balkan and European space and the better accessibility and connection 
of Southern with Northern and Western Europe. Secondly, it implements an EU 
strategic development plan for the Balkan region at various spatial, operational and 
sectoral levels with a special emphasis on the issues of intra-regional cooperation and 
integration. This development plan should include effective transportation and 
telecommunication networks that will allow the integration of the Balkans and reveal the 
special weight of Southeastern Europe as an emerging regional market with significant 
size, and a strategic advantage for the expansion of the EU economic relations in the 
Black Sea region. Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
10
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:38:29 EET - 137.108.70.7
References
CIA (1997) The World Factbook 1997. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC.
Dobrinsky R. (1999) Multi-speed transition and multi-speed integration in Europe: 
recent economic developments in the Balkans and their implications, in Petrakos G. and 
Totev S. (eds.) The Development of the Balkan Region. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
forthcoming.
EBRD (1997) Transition Report Update. April 1997, European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, London UK.
IMF (1998) Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund, USA.
Jackson M. and Petrakos G. (1999) Regional differences in the impact of EU integration 
on the industrial structure and competitiveness of CEFTA countries, paper prepared for 
the Phare ACE P96-6071-R project: Competitiveness of CEFTA countries: measurement 
and trends in the period of preparation to join the EU.
Landesmann M. (1998) Features of East-West European integration: cost structures and 
patterns of specialization. Paper presented in the international workshop on: 
“Competitiveness of the CEFTA countries: measurement and trends in the period of 
preparation to join the EU"’· Bratislava, 17-18 April, 1998.
Petrakos G. (1997a), 'The Regional Structure of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece: 
Implications for Cross-Border Cooperation and Development', European Urban and 
Regional Studies. Vol. 4, No 3, pp 193-208.
Petrakos G. (1997b), Ά European Macro-Region in the Making? The Balkan Trade 
Relations of Greece', European Planning Studies. Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 515-533.
Petrakos G. (1999) "Greece and the Balkans: Geography lost and found". Revue d’ 
Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest. Vol. 30. No. 2. (in press).
Petrakos G. and Christodoulakis N. (1997) "Economic Development in the Balkan 
Countries and the Role of Greece: From Bilateral Relations to the Challenge of 
Integration", Discussion Paper Series No 1620. Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR), London.
Petrakos G. and Totev S. (1999a) "Economic Structure and Change in the Balkan 
Region: Implications for Integration, Transition and Economic Cooperation", 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, forthcoming.
Petrakos G. and Totev S. (1999b) (eds.) The Development of the Balkan Region, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming.
Petrakos G. and Christodoulakis N. (1998) "Transition in the Balkans: Patterns of 
Change and Policies to Overcome marginalisation and Disintegration", Phare-ACE
11
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:38:29 EET - 137.108.70.7
Program "Structural Changes and Spilovers in the East European Reform Process", Final 
Report, Imperial College Management School, University of London.
United Nations (1998) World Investment Report 1998. Trends and Determinants, USA
World Bank (1999) World Development Report. Knowledge for Development 1998/99, 
Oxford University Press. USA.
12
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:38:29 EET - 137.108.70.7
Table 1. Market size and development level of the Balkan countries (1997)
Countries Population Area GDP GNP/head
million % th. m2 % Million
USD
% USD %
Albania 3 0.80 27 0.86 2,276 0.03 750 3.21
Bosnia 4 1.07 51 1.63 3,260 0.04 785 3.36
Bulgaria 8 2.14 111 3.54 9,484 0.12 1,140 4.88
Croatia 4 1.07 56 1.79 19,081 0.24 4,610 19.73
FYROM 2 0.53 25 0.80 2,061 0.03 1,090 4.66
Greece 11 2.94 129 4.11 119,111 1.47 12,010 51.40
Romania 23 6.14 230 7.34 35,204 0.44 1,420 6.08
Serbia 11 2.94 102 3.25 15,147.4 0.19 1,429 6.12
Slovenia 2 0.53 20 0.64 17,905 0.22 9,680 41.43
Turkev 64 17.09 770 24.56 181,464 2.25 3,130 13.39
Balkans 132 35.25 1521 48.51 404,993.4 5.01 5,221 22.34
EU 374.5 100.00 3,135.5 100.00 8,082.297 100.00 23,367.3 100.00
Sources: World Bank (1998-99), CIA (1997), EBRD (1997)
Table 2: Inward flows and stock of Foreign Direct Investment in the Balkans, the Central 
European countries and the EU (1997)______________________________________________
Area Inward Flows Stock
million USD per capita million USD per capita
Balkan Transition Countries 2,455 55.30 7,494 312.77
Central European Transition countries 8,556 125.20 40,401 736.31
Greece 1,500 136.36 21,864 1987.64
Turkey 606 9.47 6,431 100.48
EU 108,172 288.84 1,195,643 3192.64
Sources: Estimated from United Nations (1998)
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Table 3: Trade relations among Balkan countries
Share of exports to Balkan Countries
Countries Albania Bosnia Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Greece Romania Serbia Slovenia Turkey Balkans EU Total
Bulgaria 0,5 0,1 0,3 2,0 8,8 1,4 0,0 0,2 9,9 23,1 45,0 100,0
Croatia 0,1 15,0 0,2 1,8 0,3 0,3 0,0 12,2 0,2 30,3 51,3 100,0
FYROM 1,1 0,1 1,9 3,5 1,7 0,4 10,1 4,7 2,5 25,9 43,1 100,0
Greece 1,7 0,0 2,0 0,2 0,4 1,9 0,3 0,2 4,5 11,2 54,7 100,0
Romania 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,2 0,1 2,1 0,2 0,2 4,2 7,9 56,6 100,0
Slovenia 0,1 3,4 0,2 10,0 1,8 0,3 0,3 1,3 0,4 17,8 63,6 100,0
Turkey 0,2 0,1 0,7 0,1 0,3 1,1 1,4 0,2 0,1 4,2 46,7 100.0
Share of imports from Balkan Countries
Countries Albania Bosnia Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Greece Romania Serbia Slovenia Turkey Balkans EU Total
Bulgaria 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,6 4,9 1,4 0,0 0,2 2,5 9,8 41,9 100.0
Croatia 0,0 1,5 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,0 8,3 0,3 11,4 59,4 100,0
FYROM 0,2 0,1 5,3 4,7 2,0 0,7 11,4 9,1 4,7 38,2 41,5 100,0
Greece 0,1 0,0 1,5 0,1 0,1 0,7 0,0 0,1 1,2 3,7 67,9 100,0
Romania 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,0 1,7 0,1 0,2 1,9 4,6 52,5 100,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,3 0,2 5,0 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,5 7,3 67,4 100,0
Turkey 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,1 0,9 0,8 0,1 0,1 2,7 51,0 100,0
Source: Estimated from IMF (1998)
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Table 4: Trade relations of selected countries with their neighbouring countries
Exports to 
neighbouring 
countries as a share 
to total exports
Imports from 
neighbouring countries 
as a share to total 
imports
Total
Austria 59.2 60.6 100.0
Belgium-Luxembourg 46.9 49.9 100.0
France 43.7 42.9 100.0
Switzerland 41.8 54.8 100.0
Greece 8.1 2.8 100.0
Bulgaria 22.1 9.4 100.0
Croatia 28.4 12.4 100.0
FYROM 14.8 19.0 100.0
Romania 4.7 4.2 100.0
Source: Estimated from IMF (1998)
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ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ
Τα άρθρα της Σειράς Ερευνητικών Εργασιών διατίθενται σε περιορισμένο αριθμό αντιτύπων, 
με σκοπό την προώθηση του επιστημονικού διαλόγου και την διατύπωση κριτικών σκέψεων 
ή απόψεων. Για πληροφορίες σχετικά με την δημοσίευση επιστημονικών άρθρων και την 
απόκτηση αντιτύπων της Σειράς, απευθυνθείτε στην Γραμματεία του Τμήματος Μηχανικών 
Χωροταξίας και Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης, Πεδίον Άρεως, Βόλος 38334, τηλ. (0421) 62017, 
fax (0421) 63793
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